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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING AND EXCLUSIONARY
SUBDIVISION CONTROL-A SECOND LOOK
Roger A. Cunningham*
The Winter 1972 issue of the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform contained an interesting student article entitled
"The Interrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Ex-
clusionary Subdivision Control." 1 The author's conclusion was as
follows:
Exclusionary subdivision control practices may become
more common when cities discover that zoning ordinances
are subject to close scrutiny by the courts. Nevertheless
... subdivision control practices should have no more suc-
cess in excluding minority groups than zoning. If the courts
focus on the effect of the practice rather than the type of
practice, discrimination however achieved will not be
allowed. The fate of exclusionary subdivision control is in-
evitably tied to the fate of exclusionary zoning.
2
The thesis of this article is that the conclusion set out above is
both oversimplified and inaccurate. Contrary to the author's con-
tention in his Journal article,3 there are "viable distinctions be-
tween zoning and subdivision control," and consequently the ma-
jor exclusionary techniques available to suburban communities
through "zoning" are simply not available in connection with
"subdivision control." Dramatic attempts at racial exclusion
through subdivision control are likely to be infrequent. Although
subdivision regulations, like zoning ordinances and building
codes, require expenditures by land developers which increase the
cost of housing and thus tend to exclude the poor, the effect of
subdivision regulations on the cost of housing is relatively unim-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. S.B., 1942, J.D., 1948,
Harvard University.
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351(1971).
2 Id. at 360.
3 Id. at 356.
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portant. Furthermore, most subdivision regulations are more eas-
ily justified on health, safety, and environmental protection
grounds than are the commonly used "exclusionary" zoning tech-
niques. In the final analysis, reductions in the cost of housing will
come about only through elimination of these exclusionary zoning
techniques and effective action to cope with other factors which
contribute significantly to the high cost of housing construction.
I. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ZONING AND
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
In the student article referred to above, the author argues that
"there are no viable distinctions between zoning and subdivision
control" on the following ground:
Before an area is zoned for a particular use, the zoning board
must first ascertain whether that area is physically suited for
that use and whether the present or reasonably anticipated
level of public services (that is, streets, utilities, fire and
police protection, etc.) is adequate to meet successfully the
additional demands that full use of the area might
entail. Therefore, when an area is originally zoned, the zoning
board will thoroughly consider most if not all of the factors
later examined by a subdivision control agency. Although it is
arguable that subdivision control agencies serve a distinct
function in applying these standards to the current state of
affairs and therefore in considering changes that may have
occurred since the zoning ordinance was adopted, the
frequent practice of amending zoning ordinances and granting
variances should serve to rebut these arguments. 4
In fact, however, zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations
perform quite different, though related, functions in controlling
land development. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
(SSZEA),5 upon which a majority of the state zoning enabling
acts is based, authorizes local legislative bodies
41d. (footnotes omitted).
5 The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (hereafter cited as the SSZEA), as published
by the Government Printing Office, is out of print. The 1926 version of the SSZEA is
reprinted in ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, Appendix A, at 210-21 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1968) (with original footnotes); 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 26.01 (1968); 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, & J. JULIN, BASIC PROPERTY LAW
958-66 (1966) (with original footnotes); 3 C. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 100- I
to 100-6 (3d ed. 1956). The SSZEA was the original model for a majority of the state
zoning statutes. Although current zoning acts often embody substantial changes from the
original enabling acts, the majority of the current acts still retains the substance of the
SSZEA.
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to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size
of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that
may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of
buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence,
or other purposes.
6
The SSZEA further provides:
For any or all of said purposes the local legislative body may
divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape,
and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out the
purposes of this act; and within such districts it may regulate
and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, altera-
tion, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land. All such
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings
throughout each district, but the regulations in one district
may differ from those in other districts.
... Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the
streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers;
to promote health and the general welfare; to provide ade-
quate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to
avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such regu-
lations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among
other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving
the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land throughout such municipality.7
Thus the local zoning ordinance is the principal tool for govern-
mental allocation of land for different uses and building types
throughout the municipality. The segregation of different land
uses and building types and the exclusion of some land uses and
building types from at least some parts of the municipality is the
very essence of zoning. The principal holding in the landmark
case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co." was that exclusion
of apartments from a one- and two-family dwelling district was
valid under the fourteenth amendment. Later cases have sustained
the creation of exclusively single-family residence districts;9 rath-
6SSZEA § 1.
7Id. §§ 2,3.
8272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9See, e.g., Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18, 124 A.L.R.
1003 (1938), rehea;ing denied, 279 N.Y. 794, 19 N.E.2d 90, 124 A.L.R. 1010 (1939),
appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 503 (1939). See also Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29
292 [VOL. 6:290
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er high minimum lot-size requirements, usually on a sliding scale,
for different single-family residence districts;10 and the complete
exclusion of certain uses, e.g., heavy industry, from a municipal-
ity.11
Zoning regulations of the usual type assume that land has been
divided into separate lots or parcels for purposes of development,
and they control development of these lots or parcels essentially
as indicated in the SSZEA excerpts above. Subdivision regu-
lations, on the other hand, (1) control the spatial arrangement of
land subdivisions in terms of street patterns, block sizes and
shapes, and lot sizes and shapes, and (2) impose certain require-
ments as to construction of necessary physical improvements and
dedication of land to public use within land subdivisions.' 2 The
principal area of overlap between zoning ordinances and subdivi-
sion ordinances occurs with respect to lot sizes. Most zoning
ordinances contain a schedule of minimum lot sizes in the various
use districts into which the municipality is divided. 13 In accor-
Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946). As Anderson points out, such districts "seek to
establish and to protect what the early zoners considered to be the 'highest' use of land,
the dwelling constructed and used as a residence for one family." I R. ANDERSON, supra
note 5, at 635. For general discussion, see id. §§ 8.27 to 8.31.
10 See cases cited in note 69 infra.
11 See, e.g., Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64
A.2d 347, 9 A.L.R.2d 678 (1949).
12 Section 14 of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (hereinafter cited as the
SCPEA) requires a municipal planning commission to adopt "regulations governing the
subdivision of land within its jurisdiction" before it exercises its statutory power to
approve or disapprove subdivision plats. This section further provides that
[s]uch regulations may provide for the proper arrangement of streets in
relation to other existing or planned streets and to the master plan, for
adequate and convenient open spaces for traffic, utilities, access of
fire-fighting apparatus, recreation, light and air, and for the avoidance of
congestion of population, including minimum width and area of lots.
Such regulations may include provisions as to the extent to which streets
and other ways shall be graded and improved and to which water and sewer
and other utility mains, piping, or other facilities shall be installed as a
condition precedent to the approval of the plat .... In lieu of the completion
of such improvements and utilities prior to the final approval of the plat, the
commission may accept a bond with surety to secure to the municipality the
actual construction and installation of such improvements or utilities at a
time and according to specifications fixed by or in accordance with the
regulations of the commission.
The SCPEA, published in 1928 by the Government Printing Office, is now out of print.
It is reprinted in ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, Appendix B, at 222-71 (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1968). The SCPEA is the original model for many of the current subdivision
control statutes, and most of the rest are based on one of the other model acts prepared in
the mid-1920s. These other model acts are all quite similar to the SCPEA. For a brief
discussion of the SCPEA and the current subdivision control enabling legislation, see
Cunningham, Land-Use Control- The State and Local Programs, 50 IowA L. REV. 367,
417- 24 (1965).
13 Power to specify minimum lot sizes is derived from SSZEA, supra note 5, § I ("the
size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, [and] the density of population") and § 3 ("to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid the undue
concentration of population").
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dance with the specific authorization contained in most of the
subdivision control enabling acts,14 some (though not all) subdivi-
sion regulations also contain minimum lot size requirements. Usu-
ally the minimums are identical, but occasionally they differ, in
which case the higher minimum requirement is normally appli-
cable. 15 It is fair to say, however, that specification of minimum
lot sizes is generally regarded at the present time as part of the
zoning function, while specification of street patterns, block sizes
and shapes, and requirements as to physical improvements and
land dedications are generally regarded at the present time as the
major functions of subdivision control.
There are only two situations in which a more or less complete
blending of zoning and subdivision controls has been achieved.
One situation is where a local zoning ordinance makes provisions
for "planned unit developments" designed to permit
an entire self-contained little community ... to be built within
a zoning district, with the rules of density controlling not only
the relation of private dwellings to open space, but also the
relation of homes to commercial establishments such as the-
aters, hotels, restaurants, and quasi-commercial uses such as
schools and churches.'
6
Ordinances providing for planned unit developments usually vest
authority in the local planning board or commission, which also
administers the subdivision regulations, to regulate the internal
development of such districts-i.e., to control the allocation of
space for residential and nonresidential uses, for different types of
residential uses, and for recreational and other open-space uses.
Thus, in planned unit developments, the distinction between zon-
ing and subdivision controls does in fact largely disappear. But
since planned unit development is simply available as an option to
the land developer where the local zoning ordinance makes provi-
sion for it, the planned unit development technique is not really
capable of being used by local governments for exclusionary
purposes.1 7
14See SCPEA, supra note 12, § 14 ("minimum width and area of lots").
15 See SSZEA, supra note 5, § 9.
16 Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 630, 241 A.2d 81,83 (1968).
17 The best discussions of planned unit development are to be found in URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT (Tech. Bull.
No. 52, 1965); Symposium: Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 3, 3- 170
(1965). especially Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, id. at 47; D. MANDELKER, CONTROLLING
PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS, (American Society of Planning Officials Plan-
ning Advisory Service, 1966).
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The second situation in which zoning and subdivision controls
are blended is where, as in the zoning ordinance recently sus-
tained in Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,'8 all
subdivision development is prohibited except where the residen-
tial developer has secured, prior to the application for plat approv-
al, a special permit or variance to allow "Residential Devel-
opment Use" of the land in question. 19 The standards for the
issuance of special permits under the Ramapo zoning ordinance
are framed in terms of the availability to the proposed subdivision
of five essential facilities or services: (1) public sanitary sewers or
approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities; (3) improved public
parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) state,
county or town roads-major, secondary or collector; and (5)
firehouses. The ordinance further provides that no special permit
shall be issued unless the proposed residential development has
accumulated fifteen development points, to be computed on a
sliding scale of values assigned to the specified improvements
under the ordinance. Subdivision approval is thus a function of
the immediate availability to the proposed plat of certain munici-
pal improvements, the avowed purpose of the new zoning provi-
sions being to phase residential development according to the
town's ability to provide the above facilities or services. 20
1830 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
19 "Residential Development Use" is defined in the Ramapo ordinance as
"The erection or construction of dwellings on any vacant plots, lots or
parcels of land" (§ 46-3, as amd.); and any person who acts so as to come
within that definition "shall be deemed to be engaged in residential devel-
opment which shall be a separate use classification under this ordinance and
subject to the requirements of obtaining a special permit from the Town
Board" (§ 46-3, as amd.).
Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
20 The background of this ordinance is set out as follows in the Golden majority opinion:
Experiencing the pressures of an increase in population and the ancillary
problem of providing municipal facilities and services, the Town of Ramapo,
as early as 1964, made application for grant under section 801 of the Housing
Act of 1964 ... to develop a master plan. The plan's preparation included a
four-volume study of the existing land uses, public facilities, transportation,
industry and commerce, housing needs and projected population trends. The
proposals appearing in the studies were subsequently adopted ... and imple-
mented by way of a master plan. The master plan was followed by the
adoption of a comprehensive zoning ordinance. Additional sewage district
and drainage studies were undertaken which culminated in the adoption of a
capital budget, providing for the development of the improvements specified
in the master plan within the next six years .... [A]s a supplement to the
capital budget, the Town Board adopted a capital program which provides for
the location and sequence of additional capital improvements for the 12 years
following the life of the capital budget. The two plans, covering a period of 18
years, detail the capital improvements projected for maximum development
and conform to the specifications set forth in the master plan, the official map
and drainage plan.
Based upon these criteria, the Town subsequently adopted the subject
WINTER 1973]
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Although it is obvious that such a scheme for land use control
has a considerable potential for exclusion, the majority of the
New York Court of Appeals held, in the Golden case, that the
scheme was neither unconstitutional nor ultra vires, and that,
far from being exclusionary, the present [zoning] amendments
merely seek, by the implementation of sequential devel-
opment and timed growth, to provide a balanced cohesive
community dedicated to the efficient utilization of land.
21
The court further said:
The restrictions conform to the community's considered land
use policies as expressed in its comprehensive plan and repre-
sent a bona fide effort to maximize population density con-
sistent with orderly growth. True other alternatives, such as
off-site improvements as a prerequisite to subdivision, may be
available, but the choice as how best to proceed, in view of
the difficulties attending such exactions. . . , cannot be fault-
ed. 2
2
II. EXCLUSIONARY ZONING PRACTICES
A. Rejection of Specific Low-Cost
Housing Developments
The most dramatic cases of exclusionary zoning have been
those in which there is either a refusal to rezone a specified tract
of land to a classification which will permit a proposed "low-cost"
housing development to proceed, or a rezoning to a classification
under the terms of which a proposed low-cost housing devel-
opment is prohibited. The leading case of the first type is Dailey v.
City of Lawton,23 discussed in the Journal article noted pre-
viously.2 4 Among cases of the second type the best known are
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of
[zoning] amendments for the alleged purpose of eliminating premature subdi-
vision and urban sprawl. Residential Development is to proceed according to
the provision of adequate municipal facilities and services, with the assurance
that any concomitant restraint upon property use is to be of a "temporary"
nature and that other private uses, including the construction of individual
housing, are authorized.
Id.at 366-67, 285 N.E.2d at 294, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 142-43 (footnote omitted).
21 Id. at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
22 Id. (citation omitted).
23425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).24 Comment, The Interrrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary
Subdivision Control, 5 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 351, 357-58 (1972).
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Union City (SASSO)2 5 and Kennedy Park Homes Association,
Inc. v. City of Lackawanna,26 both discussed by the student
author,2 7 and two other cases which he does not discuss in that
article, Ranjel v. City of Lansing28 and Park View Heights Corp.
v. City of Black Jack.2 9 The author's summary of the holdings in
Lawton, SASSO, and Kennedy Park Homes is generally accurate,
but he fails to draw one important distinction. In Lawton and
Kennedy Park Homes the constitutional attack on the local zon-
ing was based on the theory that it was racially discriminatory and
exclusionary. In Ranjel, the constitutional attack was also based
on that theory. In SASSO, however, the basis of the constitutional
attack was that the local action, in overriding by referendum the
city council's decision to rezone to accommodate a low-income
housing project, would deny decent housing and an integrated
environment to the low-income residents of Union City. In the
Black Jack case the constitutional attack on the local zoning
ordinance (which prohibits construction of any new multi-family
dwellings) was based on the theory that its purpose and effect was
to exclude low- and moderate-income individuals "including
members of the Negro race" from the city.
The decisions in Lawton and Kennedy Park Homes were cer-
tainly to be expected, given the allegations and trial court findings
as to the racially exclusionary motivation and effect of the local
zoning action (or inaction). In such cases, the federal courts will
surely apply the "new" equal protection test and require the local
unit of government to show "a compelling governmental interest
in order to overcome a finding of unconstitutionality"30 where
local governmental action produces a racially discriminatory
effect. It should be noted, however, that in these cases the local
zoning action (or inaction) did not merely make the proposed
low-income housing more expensive; it absolutely prohibited con-
struction of the type of multi-family housing proposed. It should
also be noted that it is still quite uncertain whether the new equal
protection standard will be applied to cases where local zoning
action (or inaction) is alleged to result only in "economic ex-
2 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
-436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970), aff'g 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y. 1970).
27Comment, supra note 24, at 358-60.
28417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970), rev'g 293 F. Supp.
301 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
29 467. F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972).
30 Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d at 114. See also
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
"(1967).
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clusion"-i.e., exclusion of "the poor." In SASSO the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested that,
Given the recognized importance of equal opportunities in
housing, it may well be as matter of law, that it is the respon-
sibility of a city and its planning officials to see that the city's
plan as initiated or as it develops, accommodates the needs of
its low income families, who usually-if not always-are
members of minority groups.31
Similarly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Black Jack indicates that a sponsor of a proposed
low-income housing project and individuals desiring to live in the
proposed housing project have standing under the fourteenth
amendment to challenge a zoning ordinance which is alleged to
exclude low- and moderate-income individuals "including mem-
bers of the Negro race" from the area. Yet the Supreme Court's
recent decision in James v. Valtierra32 strongly suggests that it is
primarily classifications based on race which are banned by the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and that classifi-
cations based on economic status are not.
B. Major Exclusionary Pre-Zoning Techniques
Zoning frequently has the effect of excluding all but high-cost
housing, although regulations have not been adopted for the spe-
31 Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization (SASSO) v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d at 295-96. It should be noted that in SASSO the district court initially denied
plaintiff's motion for a three-judge court and a preliminary injunction. On appeal the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the contentions that the purpose
and result of the citywide referendum was to discriminate against Mexican-American
residents and that the result was to perpetuate discrimination within the city against
Mexican-American residents with low incomes did not require that a three-judge court be
convened. The court reasoned that the validity of California law was not drawn in question
and that, furthermore, the challenge was directed not at the state's grant of power but
against the manner in which the city had exercised its power. Thus the quoted statement
from the opinion of Merrill, J., is truly only dictum. For the subsequent history of the
SASSO case, see Memorandum of Decision filed by District Judge Sweigert on July 31,
1970 (N.D. Cal.).
32 402 U.S. 137 (1971). For commentary on the Valtierra case describing it as "at best a
step backward and at worst a headlong retreat from the Court's stand in favor of integrated
housing," see Bosselman, Commentary on James v. Valtierra, 23 ZONING DIGEST 117-18
(1971). For a more sympathetic view of the Valtierra case, see Lefcoe, The Public
Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384,
1409 (197 1), observing that
If the Supreme Court had regarded [the referendum article of the California
Constitution] as a racist provision, most zoning laws would have been sim-
ilarly vulnerable. This is because almost all land use controls have a tendency
to raise the price of some housing, thereby impinging on the claims of the
poor to suburban housing, and thus adversely affecting the interests of
minority people.
[VOL. 6:290
Zoning and Subdivision Control
cific purpose of blocking low-cost housing developments. The
major zoning techniques which may have this kind of exclu-
sionary effect are: (1) total or nearly total prohibition of mobile
home developments; (2) total or nearly total prohibition of mul-
ti-family housing developments; (3) imposition of high minimum
living space requirements for single-family residences; (4) imposi-
tion of high minimum lot-width requirements for lots in
single-family residence zones; and (5) imposition of high minimum
lot-size requirements in single-family residence zones.33
1. Exclusion of Mobile Homes-Zoning ordinances which
completely or largely prohibit mobile homes have the effect of
excluding the only type of housing that can realistically be re-
garded as low-cost housing today. The mobile home is, in fact, the
only kind of unsubsidized, new, low-cost housing now generally
available to low-income persons, because even medium and high
density multi-family dwellings are now so expensive to construct
that they are only available to low-income persons with the aid of
33 In recent years the legal periodicals have been filled to overflowing with articles and
student comments on the general topic of exclusionary zoning or some aspect thereof. See,
e.g., Aloi, Goldbert & White,Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell
for Home Rule?, I U. TOLEDO L. REV. 65 (1969); Becker, The Police Power and
Minimum Lot Size Zoning, Part I: A Method of Analysis, 1969 WASH U.L.Q. 263;
Marcus, Exclusionary Zoning: The Need for a Regional Planning Context, 16 N.Y.L.F.
732 (1970); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Williams, Three Systems of Land Use Control, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 80 (1970); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The
Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475 (1971); Davidoff &
Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 509 (197 1); Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the Economic and Social Impact of
Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 507 (1964); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78
YALE L.J. 1418 (1969); Note, Suburban Zoning Ordinances and Building Codes: Their
Effect on Low and Moderate Income Housing, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 123 (1969); Note,
The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970); Note, The New Jersey
Judiciary's Response to Exclusionary Zoning, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 172 (1970); Comment,
Discriminatory Zoning: Legal Battleground of the Seventies, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 157
(1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1645 (197 1);
Comment, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A Response to the Exclusionary Effects
of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND L. REV. 340 (1971); Comment, A Survey of the
Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 537 (1971); Comment,
Exclusionary Zoning: A Legislative Appraoch, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583 (1971); Com-
ment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local Zoning Decisions: Restricted Access to
State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 598 (1971); Note,
Removing the Bar of Exclusionary Zoning to a Decent Home, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 373
(1971); Note, Legitimate Exclusions Through Zoning: Applying a Balancing Test, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 461 (1972). Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary
Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971). See also Bibliography, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 627 (1971).
For popular, nonlegal discussion of exclusionary zoning and barriers to construction of
low- and moderate-income housing in the suburbs, see Conti, Keep Out: Suburban Zoning
Laws Called Discriminatory to Negroes and Poor, Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1970, at 1, col. 6;
Davidoff, Davidoff, & Gold, The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates, N.Y. Times, Nov.
7, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 40; The Battle of the Suburbs, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1971, at
61.
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a public subsidy of some kind.3 4 Judicial response to attacks on
zoning ordinances which exclude mobile homes has, however,
been quite varied.
In the leading case of Vickers v. Township Committee of Glou-
cester Township,35 the New Jersey Supreme Court sustained a
zoning ordinance which entirely excluded mobile homes from a
semi-rural township of about twenty-three square miles located in
Camden County. The gist of the ratio decidendi is contained in
the following passage from the majority opinion:
The township has begun to feel the effects of its potential
for extensive and rapid development, and has concluded that
the presence of trailer camps would hamper this potential. It
believes that the prohibition of trailer camps is in keeping
with the orderly growth of the township and best serves the
interests of the entire municipality in its development as a
desirable place in which to work and live.... [W]e would be
flying in the face of the broad powers granted to municipal-
ities by the Constitution and zoning statutes as interpreted by
our decisions if we held that the township in the present case
must, against the will of its governing body, allow the con-
struction and operation of trailer camps in its industrial dis-
trict. Accordingly, we hold the plaintiff has failed to show the
township acted unreasonably in amending its zoning ordi-
nance to exclude trailer camps from its industrial district.
Since trailer camps are not permitted in the other districts,
the effect of the amending ordinance prohibiting them in the
industrial district is to bar them from the entire municipality.
There are no trailer camps in the township at present.
Plaintiff contends that total prohibition is illegal. However,
we have held that a municipality need not provide a place for
every use.... We do not think that a municipality must open
its borders to a use which it reasonably believes should be
excluded as repugnant to its planning scheme. It must be
remembered that once a use is legally established, even
though conditions impel a revision of the zoning ordinance
and the use strikes a jarring note, it cannot be eliminated by
such a revision under existing law.... If through foresight a
municipality is able to anticipate the adverse effects of par-
ticulax uses and its resulting actions are reasonable, it should
be permitted to develop without the burdens of such uses....
Our conclusion that the township had the authority to
3
4 See Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 49 1,
495-496 nn.24-28 (1970); Williams, Three Systems of Land Use Control 25 RUTGERS L.
REV. 80, 93 (1970).
35 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962),cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
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adopt the amendment is based upon the facts presented, the
circumstances of the township today and its projected devel-
opment. We have noted that the township is in a state of flux.
Its ultimate character remains indeterminate.... We are not
unmindful of the reported improvements in design and rising
popularity of trailers and the accompanying increased need
for trailer camps .... It may be that circumstances will
change and trailers and trailer camps will be an appropriate
use in some areas of the township. If at that time the provi-
sions of the ordinance become unreasonable they may be set
aside.
36
In his vigorous and now famous dissent, Justice Hall said (inter
alia):
The majority decides that this particular municipality may
constitutionally say, through exercise of the zoning power,
that its residents may not live in trailers-or in mobile homes,
to use a more descriptive term. I am convinced such a con-
clusion in this case is manifestly wrong. Of even greater
concern is the judicial process by which it is reached and the
breadth of the rationale. The import of the holding gives
almost boundless freedom to developing municipalities to
erect exclusionary walls on their boundaries, according to
local whim or selfish desire, and to use the zoning power for
aims beyond its legitimate purposes. Prohibition of mobile
home parks, although an important issue in itself, becomes, in
this larger aspect, somewhat a symbol.
Townships like Gloucester, with their vast areas of vacant
land, have plenty of room in which to accommodate the
variety of land uses people of all income levels and individual
desires may want to enjoy. Sound planning and zoning regu-
lation by appropriate districts can easily make such uses
compatible while avoiding detrimental impact on each other.
The technique is to allow for differing uses by putting them in
the right places and with ace;Rpanying restrictions....
In my opinion legitimate use of the zoning power by such
municipalities does not encompass the right to erect barri-
cades on their boundaries through exclusion or too tight re-
striction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared
disruption with a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it
encompass provisions designed to let in as new residents only
certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to live in
favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present
36 1d.at 248-50, 181 A.2d at 137-38 (citations omitted).
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property owners. When one of the above is the true situation
deeper considerations intrinsic in a free society gain the
ascendency and courts must not be hesitant to strike down
purely selfish and undemocratic enactments. I am not sug-
gesting that every such municipality must endure a plague of
locusts or suffer transition to a metropolis over night. 1 sug-
gest only that regulation rather than prohibition is the appro-
priate technique for attaining a balanced and attractive com-
munity. The opportunity to live in the open spaces in decent
housing one can afford and in the manner one desires is a
vital one in a democracy....
... What restrictions like minimum house size require-
ments, overly large lot area regulations and complete limita-
tion of dwellings to single family units really do is bring about
community-wide economic segregation. It is a proper thing to
exclude factories from residential zones to conserve property
values and to encourage the most appropriate use of land
throughout the municipality. It is quite another and improper
thing to use zoning to control who the residents of your
township will be. To reiterate, all the legitimate aspects of a
desirable and balanced community can be realized by proper
placing and regulation of uses, as the zoning statute con-
templates, without destroying the higher value of the privilege
of democratic living.
37
The fact that the United States Supreme Court denied certior-
ari in the Vickers case38 suggests that the Court did not think the
case raised any significant issue under the fourteenth amendment.
In contrast to New Jersey, the courts in Michigan have con-
sistently struck down attempts by local governments to exclude
mobile homes. 39 Most recently, in Bristow v. City of Wood-
haven, 40 the Michigan Court of Appeals held invalid the provi-
sions of a zoning ordinance which allowed trailer courts only in
B-3 General Business Districts upon grant of a permit by the
Board of Appeals, and which the trial court found to have the
practical effect of excluding all trailer parks from the city "be-
cause the amount of land zoned B-3 is small in area and already
substantially developed for commercial uses which serves to in-
crease the vacant land price to a point where mobile home parks
37 1d. at 252-53, 263-66, 181 A.2d at 140, 146-47 (footnote omitted).
38371 U.S. 233 (1963).
39 Dequindre Development Co. v. Township of Warren, 359 Mich. 634, 103 N.W.2d
600 (1960); Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Bristow
v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971); Anderson v. Town-
ship of Highland, 21 Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.2d 909 (1969).
4035 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
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are not an economic alternative to other commercial uses. '" 41
Accepting this trial court finding, the appellate court held that,
"since mobile home parks have, by virtue of state statute coupled
with judicial precedent, been afforded a protected status, there is
no longer a presumption of validity of an ordinance which oper-
ates toward their exclusion," and that the defendant city had
failed to show any justification for the exclusion. Of particular
significance is the following language from the appellate court's
opinion:
[P]rotection of this particular land use is of increased impor-
tance in view of the massive, nationwide housing shortage
which necessitates a re-defining of the term "general welfare"
as applied to justify residential zoning. That term is not a
mere catchword to permit the translation of narrow desires
into ordinances which discriminate against or operate to ex-
clude certain residential uses deemed beneficial. Citizens of
the general community have a right to decently placed, suit-
able housing within their means and such right must be a
consideration in assessing the reasonableness of local zoning
prescribing residential requirements or prohibitions. Such
zoning may never stand where its primary purpose is shown
to operate for the exclusion of a certain element of residential
dwellers. ...
... [T]he strictly local interests of a municipality must
yield if such conflict with the overall state interests of the
public at large. This is not meant to be a complete limitation
on zoning powers but rather, where certain uses are con-
cerned, a balancing must be reached between the effect of
local considerations, concerns and desires against the greater
public interest.... [P]articular care should be taken that an
unwanted and yet necessary use is not being "pushed off"
onto a neighboring community where it may be equally un-
wanted. Each factor must be considered in its proper per-
spective. Traffic patterns are valid local interests of greater
concern than aesthetics or economic uniformity. The com-
binations of factors are unlimited and each case must finally
be decided on its peculiar factual setting.
42
The Illinois appellate court has also recognized that where
certain land uses are concerned, the term "general welfare" must
be defined to meet the exigencies of an urbanized society, and that
the need for more low-cost housing is an element which must be
41 Id. at 220 n.9, 192 N.W.2d at 329 n.9.
42 1d. at 217- 18, 192 N.W.2d at 327-28 (footnote omitted).
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considered in determining the reasonableness of excluding mobile
homes from all or major portions of a community.
43
Neither the Vickers dissent nor the Bristow opinion expressly
articulates a fourteenth amendment equal protection basis for
striking down zoning ordinances which exclude mobile homes.
Justice Hall would have invalidated the Gloucester Township
ordinance on the ground that exclusion of people from the com-
munity on economic or social grounds is not within either the
police power, generally, or the zoning power, specifically. The
same rationale is expressed in the Bristow opinion with somewhat
more emphasis on the need to redefine the general welfare com-
ponent of the zoning power to include "the overall state interests
of the public at large." Yet in both cases the exclusionary zoning
regulations might well have been challenged under the new equal
protection doctrine developed by the United States Supreme
Court in cases involving racial discrimination over the past two
decades." As Professor Lawrence Sager has pointed out,4
"[T]here is a strong [judicial] impulse towards limiting the scope
of modem equal protection doctrine. The most readily available
limitation is to purposeful discriminations against racial minor-
ities." He argues, however, that recent cases demonstrate very
clearly that equal access to housing is now regarded by the Su-
preme Court "as a matter of the most serious social and con-
stitutional concern," and that "Given the close relationship be-
tween residential isolation and vulnerability to governmental and
private discrimination, inferior housing and education, and social
immobility, this concern does not seem either surprising or mis-
placed." 46 Hence, while this concern has been manifest mainly in
the context of racial discrimination,
there is reason to expect that it will be evoked on behalf of
the indigent as well. The problems and values involved are
almost certainly socioeconomic as well as racial. Moreover, if
there is any one area that, in addition to criminal justice and
the franchise, is apt to move the Court, it is the area of severe
43 Lakeland Bluffs, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Il. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.2d 765 (1969).
It is generally held, however, that a zoning ordinance is a valid exercise of the police
power when its limits mobile homes to designated mobile home parks so as to facilitate
police and fire protection, to regulate health conditions, and to facilitate provision of water,
sewage disposal, and lighting services. See, e.g., State v. Larson, - Minn. -, 195 N.W.2d
180 (1972). Generally, see Bartke & Gage, supra note 34, at 496-514.
4 See note 30 and accompanying text supra; see also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,
391-92 (1969).
4 Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 779 (1969).
46 Id. at 790.
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inhibitions to social mobility and opportunity, within which
area open access to housing, like education, would seem to be
a matter of great importance.
47
2. Exclusion of Multi-Family Dwellings-It is clear that total
prohibition of multi-family housing developments largely deprives
both low-income and lower-middle-income persons of access to
new suburban housing; moreover, since most of the govern-
mentally subsidized forms of low-income housing necessarily con-
sist of multi-family projects, total prohibition of multi-family hous-
ing developments also excludes the poor.48 Even when mul-
ti-family dwellings are permitted in suburban areas, such dwell-
ings are often not permitted to have more than one or two bed-
rooms. A common zoning restriction provides that at least 80
percent of the dwelling units in a multi-family development must
have only one bedroom, with up to 20 percent permitted to have
two bedrooms. 49 Since lower income groups, and particularly
racial and ethnic minorities in the central cities, tend to have large
families and normally can afford only multi-family dwelling ac-
commodations, it seems clear that exclusion of or restrictions on
multi-family dwellings tend to perpetuate both economic and ra-
cial or ethnic segregation.
50
It is clear that a municipality which already has a substantial
amount of apartment development may be justified in amending
its zoning ordinance so as to prohibit further apartment construc-
tion within its corporate limits. 51 Nevertheless the efforts of sub-
urban communities with substantial undeveloped land areas to
exclude or to limit severely the construction of apartments
present a much more difficult problem. 52 Until quite recently, total
47 Id.
4 8 Williams, supra note 34, at 93.
49 See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. I1,
283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971).
5 0 Williams, supra note 34, at 93. The National Commission on Urban Problems stated
in its 1968 Report that of the undeveloped land zoned for residential use in the New York
City metropolitan area, 99.2 percent is restricted to single-family dwellings. NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 215 (1968) (here-
inafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY). Professor Anderson found that in
Westchester County, New York most of the land zoned for residential use is restricted to
single-family dwellings; that multi-family dwellings are zoned out of many municipalities
and provided with minimal area for construction in others; that mobile homes are excluded
from nearly all municipalities; and that minimal provision is made for two-family dwellings,
town houses, row houses, and the like. Anderson, Introduction to Symposium: Ex-
clusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 465 (197 1).
51 Fanale v. Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
52 Generally, see Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,
I Il U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1963). Cf. G. NEUTZE, THE SUBURBAN APARTMENT BOOM 45
(1968).
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or substantially total exclusion of apartments from a suburban
town seems not to have been successfully challenged in the
courts. In Appeal of Girsh,53 however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in a 4-3 decision invalidated a suburban Philadelphia town-
ship's zoning ordinance insofar as it totally prohibited apartment
construction. The rationale of the decision is contained in the
following language from the majority opinion:
This case presents a situation where ... the Township is
trying to "stand in the way of the natural forces which send
our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live." Appellee here has
simply made a decision that it is content with things as they
are, and that the expense or change in character that would
result from people moving in to find "a comfortable place to
live" are for someone else to worry about. That decision is
unacceptable. Statistics indicate that people are attempting to
move away from the urban core areas, relieving the grossly
over-crowded conditions that exist in most of our major
cities. Figures show that most new jobs that are being created
in urban areas, including the one here in question, are in the
suburbs.... Thus the suburbs, which at one time were mere-
ly "bedrooms" for those who worked in the urban core, are
now becoming active business areas in their own right. It
follows that formerly "outlying," somewhat rural commu-
nities, are becoming logical areas for development and popu-
lation growth .... With improvement in regional trans-
portation systems, these areas also are now more accessible
to the central city.
In light of this, Nether Providence Township may not
permissibly choose to only take as many people as can live in
single-family housing, in effect freezing the population at near
present levels. Obviously, if every municipality took that
view, population spread would be completely frustrated. Mu-
nicipal services must be provided somewhere, and if Nether
Providence is a logical place for development to take place, it
should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part
of the burden. Certainly it can protect its attractive character
by requiring apartments to be built in accordance with (rea-
sonable) set-back, open space, height, and other light-and-air
requirements, but it cannot refuse to make any provision for
apartment living. The simple fact that someone is anxious to
build apartments is strong indication that the location of this
township is such that people are desirous of moving in, and
53437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
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we do not believe Nether Providence can close its doors to
those people.
54
It should be noted that, as in the Michigan mobile home ex-
clusion cases, Appeal of Girsh relies on the theory that such
exclusion does not promote the general welfare and is therefore
not within the police power generally, nor within the zoning
power delegated to local governments by zoning enabling acts.
Girsh does not refer to the fourteenth amendment or to the equal
protection clause.
3. Minimum Living Space Requirements-The exclusionary
effect of large minimum living space requirements for single-
family dwellings would also appear to be quite substantial. A
recent study indicates that in some counties in northern New
Jersey, for example, of the vacant land which is zoned for resi-
dence and can be readily developed for that purpose, about 75
percent is zoned to require houses with at least 1,200 square feet
of living space, and that substantial areas are zoned to require
houses with at least 1,600 square feet of living space.55 As Profes-
sor Norman Williams, Jr., has recently pointed out:
Since space enclosed by four walls (i.e., housing) is so much
more expensive than land, stiff minimum-building-size re-
quirements obviously have the most direct impact in raising
the cost of housing. A twelve-hundred-square-foot house
probably now costs $30,000; obviously a lot of people can't
afford that. 56
The leading case upholding the validity of substantial minimum
floor space requirements for single-family dwellings is Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne. 57 After citing the Lionshead
Lake case in the recent Oakwood at Madison58 case, the Superior
54 Id. at 244-45, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (citation and footnotes omitted).
5 Williams, supra note 34, at 93. According to a 1966 survey, minimum living space
requirements were included in the zoning ordinances of 292 of the 496 New Jersey
municipalities with zoning ordinances on file in the State Planning Office. Williams &
Wacks, Segregation of Residential Areas Along Economic Lines: Lionshead Lake Re-
visited, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 827, 829 n.5. A recent survey prepared by the Bureau of the
Census for the National Commission on Urban Problems indicates that nationally about
45 percent of all zoned communities (and over 50 percent of all zoned communities in
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) have minimum living space requirements for
single-family dwellings; and that, of these zoned communities, about 7 percent require
1,000 square feet or more, nearly 30 percent require between 600 and 1,000 square feet,
and only about 4 percent require less than 600 square feet. BUILDING TH4E AMERICAN
CITY, supra note 50, at 216 (Table 8).
56 Williams, supra note 34, at 94.
57 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), for want of
a substantial federal question.58 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d
353 (Law Div. 1971).
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Court of New Jersey simply observed that Lionshead Lake "is
controlling if, in context with the entire challenged Madison
Township zoning ordinance, the minimum floor spaces of 1,500
square feet in R40 and 1,600 square feet in R80 serve the valid
zoning purpose of a balanced community." 59 In other states min-
imum living space requirements have had a mixed reception in the
courts.6 0 The Lionshead Lake decision has been vigorously criti-
cized in the legal periodicals.61 One of the most recent critics,
Professor Sager, observes:
The conclusion that minimum-floor-space zoning is con-
stitutionally justifiable only in those situations where a bona
fide health and safety argument can be made has been drawn
before by a few scholars, and even by a number of courts,
though not in equal protection terms.
6 2
59 Id. at 20, 283 A.2d at 358.
6o Minimum living space requirements for single family dwellings were sustained in De
Mars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955); Dundee Realty Co. v.
City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944); Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Village
of Flower Hill, 199 Misc. 344, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Thompson v. City of
Carrolton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Contra, Elizabeth Lakes Estates v.
Waterford Twp., 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W.2d 788 (1947); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v.
Building Inspector, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209 (1946); Senefsky v. Lawler, 307 Mich.
728, 12 N.W.2d 387, 149 A.L.R. 1433 (1943); Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d
118 (1954).
61 Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L.
REV. 1051 (1953); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 986 (1954). The article first cited generated an "answer" which took an approving
view of the Lionshead Lake case: Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for
Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1954). This answer in turn
generated the "reply" by Professor Haar cited above. For a recent highly critical recon-
sideration of the Lionshead Lake case, see Williams & Wacks, supra note 55.
62 Sager, supra note 45, at 796. Professor Sager also points out that:
[Als regards health and safety, there ought to be a factual showing that the
required minimum can in fact substantially enhance that interest .... [T]he
burden ought to be on the municipality once the exclusionary effect is
documented.
Id. at 794. For a strong argument that the Lionshead Lake space requirements are justified
on health and safety grounds, see Nolan & Horack, supra note 61. Professor Sager offers
the following pertinent comments on other common justifications advanced for minimum
living space requirements:
The municipal-services-and-resources argument is more easily dealt with.
It is, in the context of minimum-floor-space enactments, apparently based on
the notion that larger houses will be more expensive and thus productive of
greater tax revenues, while at the same time the richer inhabitants will place
a smaller demand on municipal services-certainly on welfare programs,
possibly on schools, and possibly even on police services. Though perhaps
factually accurate, this argument is of dubious constitutional merit. That
municipalities are creatures of the state is longstanding dogma. It therefore
seems constitutionally questionable for the state to create and sustain a
system of incorporation, local taxation, and provision of services that allows
radical inequalities of services and tax burdens to develop within the state.
To suggest in turn that exclusionary zoning can be constitutionally justified
by the municipality's desire to insulate itself from expenses that others in the
state will have to bear, and moreover, to constitute itself of a population that
is most able to bear those very expenses, is to proceed on rather weak
ground.
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4. Minimum Lot-Width Requirements- Excessive minimum
lot-width requirements, like excessive minimum lot-area require-
ments, may be imposed either by a zoning ordinance or by subdi-
vision regulations. Since frontage is expensive, normally involving
at least the costs of street paving and sanitary sewers, it is clear
that such requirements have a substantial effect in raising the cost
of single-family housing; 63 but the exclusionary effect of such
requirements is certainly not comparable to the other devices
discussed above-exclusion of mobile homes and multi-family
dwellings, and imposition of large minimum living space require-
ments for single-family dwellings. Lot-width requirements have
been upheld where they were found to be reasonable in relation to
the surrounding area,64 and have been struck down where they
deprived the landowner of all reasonable use of his land.
6 5
The third justification is the preservation of land values, which is a decep-
tively simple way of stating one or more of a complex of claims. When courts
speak of land values they may be referring to the problem of how heavily
land is to be surcharged to provide for municipal services, which has a clear
effect on land value .... Or, what may be involved is a question of aesthetics.
... Finally, and most directly, the issue may be one of social, or less
delicately, of snob values. The proposition is simple: People like to live in
exclusive neighborhoods because of the status and congeniality they may
expect to derive from their neighbors (and their neighbors' large houses), and
they are prepared to pay for the privilege. That the poor and near poor are
more apt to be black or brown may enhance the feeling. Zoning restrictions
that cater to these tastes thus increase the value of the affected property.
The argument is not only simple, it is pernicious. If the preferences of
those of means made it more profitable for a city to segregate people on its
transit facilities, one- would hardly be moved to view that circumstance as
speaking to the question of justification for the discrimination. Similarly, to
employ property values as a basis for excluding the poor from neighborhoods
is to employ the apparent neutrality of dollar valuation as a means of placing
government in a posture of implementing preferences it is constitutionally
estopped from accommodating. If this were acknowledged as justificatory
here, presumably much the same argument would apply to overt racial
zoning.
The preservation of the character and beauty of the neighborhood is
anchor man on the minimum-house-size relay. Assuming aesthetic zoning to
be valid, attempts to dictate beauty with standards of floor space seem
hopelessly crude .... The a priori incompatibility of heterogeneity of size and
attractiveness on a neighborhood scale would seem, in any event, a difficult
argument to make out. A court might well require that a more selective and
less injurious device than a minimum-house-size ordinance be employed to
prevent potential visual disharmony, such as a board of architectural review.
Yet another version of the aesthetics argument would rely on the incapacity
of the poor to maintain their premises as well as individuals with greater
resources. This claim would require empirical support of a kind very hard to
come by, particularly since those of lesser means have only rarely been
afforded the opportunity to live in neighborhoods to which blight is not in
some way endemic. It also raises serious questions of social policy.
Sager, supra note 45, at 794-96 (footnotes omitted).
63 Williams, supra note 34, at 94.
64 See, e.g., Korby v, Township of Redford, 348 Mich. 193, 82 N.W.2d 441 (1957);
Cloverdale Enterprises, Inc. v. D'Abramo, 16 App. Div. 2d 675, 227 N.Y.S.2d 136
(1962).
6See, e.g., Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (195 I);
Milano v. Town of Patterson, 197 Misc. 457, 93 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1947).
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5. Minimum Lot-Size Requirements-Exclusionary zoning is
currently one of the most controversial subjects in the field of land
use controls. The subject has produced a staggering amount of
legal periodical literature in the past two or three years.66 Strange-
ly, "large lot zoning" has received most of the attention of the law
review writers, although large lot requirements probably do not
play a major role in raising the cost of housing in suburban areas.
Of course, if an entire suburban town is zoned for very large
lots-three, four, or five acres-this will preclude any possibility
of some inexpensive housing and thus exclude low-income per-
sons. But if a suburban town is zoned to provide for various levels
of density, the fact that a portion of the town's area is zoned for
very large lot minimums may have little significance. As Professor
Williams has recently observed:
The important question, then, is not whether part of the land
in a town is zoned for one acre, two or five, or even ten, but
whether a substantial part of the town is zoned to permit
much less expensive housing-either garden apartments at
10 to 25 per acre, or mobile homes. If provision is made for
the latter, then the largest lot size required in the rest of the
town is a point of rather small significance, from the view-
point of our concern here [with respect to exclusionary zon-
ing]. The question on acreage zoning is not thus one of
principle, but rather of the extent of its mapping.
67
To the extent that a suburban town zones a relatively large
portion of its area for large minimum lots, there is of course a
substantial exclusionary effect upon low-income persons. 68
66 See articles cited in note 33 supra.
67 Williams, supra note 34, at 95. Williams also points out:
First, and most obviously, land is far less expensive than enclosed space, i.e.,
housing. Second, while the price of land varies considerably as between
communities, within a given community the price of residential building lots
does not vary directly according to their size; a developer can often get
almost as much for a half-acre lot as for a one-acre lot. A shift to smaller lots
is thus more likely to provide a windfall for the developer than to provide
much help for potential purchasers of homes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
68The National Commission on Urban Problems indicated that 90 percent of the
undeveloped land in the New York metropolitan area which is zoned for residential uses is
subject to minimum lot size requirements of one-quarter acre or more, and that two-thirds
of this land is subject to lot minimums of at least one-half acre; that in Connecticut more
than 50 percent of the vacant land zoned for residential use in the entire state is subject to
minimum lot size requirements of one to two acres, with Greenwich (close to New York
City) having more than 80 percent of its total undeveloped area zoned for minimum lots of
one acre or more; and that in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which contains the City of
Cleveland, some 85,200 acres of vacant land are zoned for single-family dwellings, with 33
percent of this vacant land zoned for minimum lots of one-half acre or less, 50 percent
zoned for minimum lots of one to two acres, and 17 percent zoned for minimum lots of two
acres or more. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,supra note 50, at 214- 15.
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Until recently, large lot requirements have been judicially sus-
tained in most states without much difficulty. 69 The first case
upholding such requirements was Simon v. Town of Needham,
70
where the Massachusetts Supreme Court sustained a requirement
of one acre lot minimums in a single-family district covering
"nearly all of the south side of the town." The court stated:
The establishment of a neighborhood of homes in such a way
as to avoid congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire
and other dangers, to prevent overcrowding of land, to obtain
adequate light, air and sunshine, and to enable it to be fur-
nished with transportation, water, light, sewer and other pub-
lic necessities, which when established would tend to improve
and beautify the town and would harmonize with the natural
characteristics of the locality, could be materially facilitated
by a regulation that prescribed a reasonable minimum area for
house lots.
The advantages enjoyed by those living in one family
dwellings located upon an acre lot might be thought to exceed
those possessed by persons living upon a lot of ten thousand
square feet. More freedom from noise and traffic might result.
The danger from fire from outside sources might be reduced.
A better opportunity for rest and relaxation might be
afforded. Greater facilities for children to play on the prem-
ises and not in the streets would be available.
71
The Simon opinion contains a significant dictum which anticipates
by three decades the objections currently being made with respect
to large lot-size requirements:
The expense that might be incurred by a town in furnishing
police and fire protection, the construction and maintenance
of public ways, schoolhouses, water mains and sewers and
other public conveniences might be considered as an element,
69 See, e.g., Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959) (four-acre
minimum upheld); Honeck v. County of Cook, 12 Ill. 2d 257, 146 N.E.2d 35 (1957)
(five-acre minimum upheld); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Coun-
cil, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969) (two-acre minimum upheld); Queen Anne's County
v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1966) (five-acre minimum upheld); Simon v. Town
of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 141 A.L.R. 688 (1942) (one-acre minimum
upheld); Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952)
(three-acre minimum upheld); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, I I N.J. 194, 93 A.2d
378 (1952) (five-acre minimum upheld). Contra, Appeal of Concord Twp. (Kit-Mar Build-
ers, Inc.), 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two- and three-acre minimums, with 80
percent of township zoned for the latter, held invalid); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (four-acre minimum
for 30 percent of township area held invalid); Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) (two-acre minimum in western two-thirds of county held
invalid).
70311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 141 A.L.R. 688 (1942).
71 Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 518, 41 A.L.R. at 691.
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more or less incidentally involved, in the adoption of a zoning
by-law that will promote the health, safety, convenience, mor-
als or welfare of the inhabitants of the town without imposing
any unreasonable and arbitrary burden upon the landowners.
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting
up a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respectable cit-
izens who desire to live there and who are able and willing to
erect homes upon lots upon which fair and reasonable restric-
tions have been imposed, nor for the purpose of protecting
the large estates already located in the district. The strictly
local interests of the town must yield if it appears that they
are plainly in conflict with the general interests of the public
at large, and in such instances the interest of the "municipal-
ity would not be allowed to stand in the way." Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390.72
Most of the later cases upholding lot minimums of from one to
five acres rely on justifications like those stated in the Simon case.
These include protection of health and safety, the need to avoid
surcharge of public services and revenues, preservation of land
values, aesthetic considerations and preservation of the "charac-
ter of the community." ' 73 Two recent Pennsylvania cases may,
72 Id. at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519, 41 A.L.R. at 692.
73 Professor Sager's comment on the conventional justifications is as follows:
The health and safety claim here relates to density of land use rather than
density of building occupancy. Accordingly, it is apt to be somewhat easier to
appraise the claim, and it is more likely to be found wanting. A relatively low
minimum lot size can probably be demonstrated to be substantially adequate,
and at some point along the way to 5-acre zoning the argument will simply be
dismissable as frivolous.
On the other hand, the relationship between lot size and the surcharge on
public services that may result from a great influx of urban population is quite
strong. The restraint on the number of households effectuated by
large-lot-size restrictions is a restraint on the total demand for services and
may permit the more rational and systematic absorption of new residents.
But this argument implies a planned and controlled change of the affected
area, not a firm posture of opposition to change. In order to invoke it, the
municipality would have to demonstrate that its exclusionary posture was
temporary, a planned phase of development, and not one which by design,
inertia, or establishment of land-ownership patterns would become per-
manent.
The property-value argument here is resolvable into very much the same
components examined in the context of minimum-floor-space enactments. ...
That returns the discussion to aesthetics. It is this part of the analysis that
makes the justifiability of minimum-lot-size zoning much harder to discount.
Strong arguments can be made that even very large minimums, say of 5
acres, contribute substantially to the beauty of an area and may serve to
preserve its distinctive character, whether it be formed of large aging estates
or is essentially rural. However, this last argument can be turned against
exclusionary zoning as well. The special character or beauty of a neighbor-
hood is a kind of resource, the denial of which raises to special prominence
the desirability complaint of the excluded. The response on behalf of the
municipality, of course, is that without lot-size zoning the resource will be
destroyed and the discussion of its distribution rendered moot.
Sager, supra note 45, at -796-97 (footnote omitted).
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however, signal the beginning of a period when courts will exam-
ine more critically the usual arguments advanced in support of
large lot requirements.
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township
Board ofAdjustment,74 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a 5- 2
decision struck down the four-acre minimums imposed by the
township ordinance as "unreasonable" and therefore uncon-
stitutional on due process grounds. The court said:
Although there was some evidence in the record that lots of
four acres or more could eventually be sold, it is clear that
there is not a readily available market for such offerings.
Against this deprivation of value, the alleged public pur-
poses cited as justification for the imposition of a four acre
minimum area requirement upon appellees' land must be ex-
amined.
75
In the course of this examination, the court expressly rejected the
township's arguments that (1) the four acre minimum was neces-
sary to insure proper sewage disposal in the township and to
protect township water from pollution; (2) the township roads
were inadequate to handle traffic generated by land development
on one acre lots; (3) four acre minimums were necessary to
preserve the "character" of the community.
In Appeal of Concord Township (Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.),7 6 the
Pennsylvania court held in a 4-3 decision that "[t]he two and
three acre minimums imposed in this case are no more reasonable
than the four acre requirement struck down in National Land,"7 7
and therefore were unconstitutional. The essence of the majority's
position is found in the following excerpt from the opinion:
We in effect held in National Land that because there were
alternative methods for dealing with nearly all the problems
that attend a growth in population, including sewage prob-
lems, zoning which had an exclusive purpose or effect could
not be allowed. ...
... We once again reaffirm our past authority and refuse to
allow the township to do precisely what we have never per-
mitted-keep out people, rather than make community im-
provements.
The implication of our decision in National Land is that
communities must deal with the problems of population
growth. They may not refuse to confront the future by adopt-
14419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).75 Id. at 524-25, 215 A.2d at 608.
76439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
77 Id.at 470-7 1, 268 A.2d at 766.
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ing zoning regulations that effectively restrict population to
near present levels. It is not for any given township to say
who may or may not live within its confines, while dis-
regarding the interests of the entire area. If Concord Town-
ship is successful in unnaturally limiting its population growth
through the use of exclusive zoning regulations, the people
who would normally live there will inevitably have to live in
another community, and the requirement that they do so is
not a decision that Concord Township should alone be able to
make.
... Neither Concord Township nor Easttown Township
nor any other local governing unit may retreat behind a cover
of exclusive zoning. We fully realize that the overall solution
to these problems lies with greater regional planning; but until
the time comes that we have such a system we must confront
the situation as it is. The power currently resides in the hands
of each local governing unit, and we will not tolerate their
abusing that power in attempting to zone out growth at the
expense of neighboring communities.
78
It should be noted that, whereas the National Land decision is
actually based on due process grounds, Kit-Mar seems to be
based more on the idea that exclusionary zoning does not promote
the general welfare of the state and region, and consequently is
not within the zoning power delegated to local governmental
units. Neither opinion makes any overt reference to equal protec-
tion objections. The regional planning called for in Kit-Mar pro-
vided the basis for the two-acre lot minimums upheld in Norbeck
Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council,79 and was
clearly the factor that justified the large lot minimums despite
their exclusionary effect.
In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,80 the
New Jersey Superior Court recently struck down a local zoning
ordinance which embodied most of the exclusionary zoning prac-
tices previously referred to-a substantially complete exclusion of
apartment construction, with severe size limitations on apart-
ments in the small areas where apartment construction was per-
mitted; high minimum living space requirements for single-family
houses; and minimum lot sizes of either one or two acres through-
out most of the remaining undeveloped land which was zoned for
single-family residences. Although the court rejected a challenge
78 Id. at 473- 76, 268 A.2d at 768- 69 (Roberts, J.) (citation and footnote omitted).
79 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969).
30 117 N.J. Super. 1], 283 A.2d 353 (Law Div. 1971).
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to the New Jersey zoning enabling act based on the argument that
it fails explicitly to include provision of needed housing as a
purpose of local zoning, the court held that the Madison Town-
ship ordinance was invalid on the following grounds:
About 8000 acres of land, apparently prime for low or moder-
ate housing development, have been taken out of the reach of
90% of the population, prohibitive in land and construction
costs. The acreage available for multi-family apartments units
is miniscule. Families with more than one child are barred
from multi-family apartments because of the one and two
bedroom restrictions, restrictions without any guise of a
health or safety purpose.
The exclusionary approach in the ordinance under attack
coincides in time with desperate housing needs in the country
and region and expanding programs, federal and state, for
subsidized housing for low income families.
In pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced commu-
nity, a municipality must not ignore housing needs, that is, its
fair proportion of the obligation to meet the housing needs of
its own population and of the region. Housing needs are
encompassed within the general welfare. The general welfare
does not stop at each municipal boundary. Large areas of
vacant and developable land should not be zoned, as Madison
Township has, into such minimum lot sizes and with other
restrictions that regional as well as local housing needs are
shunted aside.81
III. EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF SUBDIVISION
CONTROLS
Of the exclusionary zoning practices discussed above in part II
of this article, only minimum lot-width and minimum lot-size
requirements can also be imposed by means of subdivision con-
trols. Of course, to the extent that excessive requirements of
these kinds in a zoning ordinance are invalid because their ex-
clusionary effect is incompatible with equal protection or general
welfare concepts, such requirements will be equally invalid if
embodied in local subdivision regulations instead of in the local
zoning ordinance. Yet none of the major exclusionary zoning
practices-exclusion of mobile homes and apartments and ex-
cessive minimum living space requirements for single-family
dwellings-is authorized by any of the subdivision control en-
81 Id. at 20-21, 283 A.2d at 358.
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abling acts; these acts do not deal at all with the basic allocation
of land uses and building types within a local governmental unit.
This basic allocation is controlled by the local zoning ordinance
8 2
Thus it seems clear that subdivision controls have a substantial
effect in excluding potential residents from suburban communities
only to the extent that they indirectly increase the cost of subur-
ban housing. Generally speaking, subdivision control enabling
acts give local planning boards or governing bodies the power to
refuse subdivision approval only where a subdivider fails to com-
ply with requirements imposed by the local subdivision regu-
lations,83 and the net effect of compliance with these regulations is
simply to increase the cost of the housing constructed in the
subdivision in comparison with the costs that might obtain in the
absence of such regulations.
Occasionally, of course, the costs imposed upon a subdivider in
order to comply with the local subdivision regulations may lead
him to decide not to develop land in a particular community, and
this decision will have at least a temporary exclusionary effect.
Occasionally, also, local officials may refuse subdivision approval
on the broad ground that subdivision development will place an
undue burden upon public services generally, or upon particular
public services such as sewage disposal or school facilities. If it
can be shown that the refusal to approve a subdivision is truly
motivated by racial prejudice rather than by the stated reason, the
courts should, of course, set aside the local action as they did in
Dailey v. City of Lawton8 4 and Kennedy Park Homes Associ-
ation, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna,85 two of the zoning cases cited
in the previously mentioned Journal article in support of the
proposition that a municipality may "not use zoning procedures to
effectuate the discriminatory goals of its residents. 8 6 Even where
proof of discriminatory intent is not clear, subdivision approval
should be judicially compelled if the effect of a refusal to approve
will clearly include racially discriminatory effects, as was arguably
the situation in the Kennedy Park Homes case. Such dis-
criminatory effect is, however, not likely to be demonstrable very
often in subdivision control cases. Furthermore, the courts are
likely to strike down local action in refusing to approve subdivi-
sions on the simple ground that the enabling act does not author-
ize rejection of the subdivision for the reasons given by the local
8
2 See discussion in part I supra.
83 SCPEA, supra note 12, § 14.
a425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
- 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
86 Comment, supra note 24, at 358.
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authorities,8 7 in which case the issue of discrimination will ordi-
narily not be reached.
There is no doubt that the cost of housing is very high in
comparison with most of the other components of the American
cost of living index, and that the cost of housing has been rising
more rapidly than most other items in that index 8 It is also true
that the single most dramatic increase in the cost of a major
component of new housing has occurred in site costs, which
consist of the costs of land acquisition and site improvement.8 9
Site improvement costs are incurred in preparing a site for build-
ing and in providing required facilities for servicing the structure
once erected. Where land is newly subdivided, site improvement
costs will usually include not only the costs involved in preparing
the site itself for the building-clearing, excavating, grading, land-
scaping, and the like-but also the costs of providing streets,
curbs, sidewalks, gutters, street lighting, sewers, and a variety of
other facilities required by subdivision regulations. Site improve-
ment costs may well be larger in certain instances than land
acquisition costs.90 Such costs vary with the geographical nature
of the area and characteristics of the terrain on which the particu-
lar housing project is located. In most localities, however, more
important than peculiar geographical conditions are the require-
ments of local subdivision regulations which prescribe standards
for streets, curbs, and other physical improvements,91 and which
may also require that land be dedicated to public use, or fees be
paid in lieu of dedication, to provide open space for playgrounds,
parks, or school sites. 92 Site improvement costs also depend to
some extent on the size of lots, and more particularly on the width
8 7 See SCPEA, supra note 12, § 14.
88 Useful data on housing costs are surprisingly scarce. In part, this is
attributable to the difficulties of comparing figures for different builders and
different projects and to the fact that most builders produce only a small
number of units each year. In addition, there is no central source which
attempts to collect and disseminate detailed cost statistics.
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 50, at 418.
89 Id. at 422.
90 Id. at 423.
91 Id. at 424.
92 Among the recent significant cases upholding subdivision regulations requiring land
dedication or payment of fees in lieu of dedication are the following: Associated Home
Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971);
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964);
Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1966); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966). Contra, Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. Village of
Mt. Prospect, 22 111. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,
19 I1. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108
(1961).
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of lots. Lot width determines the number of linear feet of street
improvements required to service one house, and each additional
foot results in added costs.
Having said all this, however, it still remains true that in most
parts of the United States all site costs, including site improve-
ment costs and land acquisition costs, represent a relatively small
percentage of the total cost of new housing. The average total site
cost including land acquisition costs for single-family houses in-
sured under Section 203 of the National Housing Act 93 in 1966
was not quite 20 percent of total cost, and ranged from 11.1
percent in Idaho to 26.1 percent in California. 94 Yet in 1966-67
site improvement costs in selected single-family developments
averaged only 8 percent of the total selling price of such houses in
California, 9.8 percent in the Midwest, and 12.9 percent in the
Northeast. 95 In multi-family developments assisted by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
begun in 1966, total site costs per unit constituted only 18 percent
of the total development expenses of the highest cost project, 14
percent of the total development expenses of the median cost
project, and 3 percent of the total development expenses of the
lowest cost project. 96 During the period from 1962 to 1966, site
improvement costs for eighty-seven selected HUD-assisted
multi-family projects ranged from a high of 17.1 percent of total
development expenses, to a low of 0.1 percent of total devel-
opment expenses, with a median site improvement cost of 5.9
percent of total development expenses. 97
Since only a portion of the site improvement expense can be
attributed to subdivision regulations, which in many instances are
not applicable to apartment developments, 98 it is apparent that the
total impact of subdivision regulations upon housing costs is rela-
tively minor. It would therefore seem clear that the usual types of
subdivision regulations requiring the subdivider to make various
physical improvements on the land and to dedicate land for streets
(and perhaps for other public uses) cannot be regarded as having a
serious exclusionary effect with respect to low-income and
lower-middle-income persons who would like to move into subur-
9312 U.S.C.§ 1709 (1970).
94 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 50, at 422 (1968).
95 Id. at 418 (Table 1).
96 Id. at 420 (Table 5).
97 Id. at 421 (Table 7).
98 Subdivision regulations will not be applicable to apartment developments unless (a)
the developer prefers to subdivide his tract into several lots, or (b) the zoning ordinance
requires each apartment building to be on a separate lot, so that the developer is compelled
to subdivide in order to comply with the zoning ordinance.
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ban areas. Moreover, most of the addition to the cost of housing
attributable to subdivision regulations is clearly justifiable on the
basis of health, safety and environmental considerations and only
a small portion thereof can be assumed to represent excessive
subdivision requirements. Even if subdivision regulations did not
usually require the subdivider to pay initially for required im-
provements in the subdivision, these would still be needed, and
the purchasers of subdivision lots would normally be required to
pay for such improvements by means of special assessments.
Indeed, the trend in the state courts is now clearly in favor of
upholding even the more burdensome subdivision exactions of
land, or money payments in lieu of land, to provide for play-
grounds, parks, and school sites, although such facilities have not
traditionally been financed on a special assessment basis.99
IV. STATE AND REGIONAL LAND USE CONTROL
Exclusion of the poor, white or nonwhite, from the suburban
areas of metropolitan regions where most of the presently undeve-
loped land is located and most of the new job opportunities exist,
is a serious national problem. There is, however, no evidence that
subdivision controls have played a substantial role in bringing
about this exclusion. There is considerable evidence, on the other
hand, that exclusionary zoning practices of the types discussed in
this article have played a major part in excluding the poor from
the suburbs. It is nevertheless unlikely that sporadic federal court
action in striking down particular zoning ordinance provisions in
cases like Dailey v. City of Lawton100 and Kennedy Park Homes
Association v. City of Lackawanna,10' where racially dis-
99 See cases cited in note 92 supra. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d at 648, 484 P.2d at 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 642, the California Suprem(
Court stated:
It may come to pass, as Associated states, that subdividers will transfer
the cost of the dedicated land or the in-lieu fee to the consumers who
ultimately purchase homes in the subdivision, thereby to some extent in-
creasing the price of houses to newcomers. While we recognize the ominous
possibility that the contributions required by a city can be deliberately set
unreasonably high in order to prevent the influx of economically depressed
persons into the community, a circumstance which would present serious
social and legal problems, there is nothing to indicate that the enactments of
Walnut Creek in the present case raise such a spectre. The desirability of
encouraging developers to build low-cost housing cannot be denied and
unreasonable exactions could defeat this object, but these considerations
must be balanced against the phenomenon of the appallingly rapid dis-
appearance of open areas in and around our cities.
100425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
101 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970).
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criminatory motivation was alleged and proved, will provide an
effective solution to the problem of exclusionary zoning. It also
seems unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will extend
its new equal protection doctrines to cases where exclusionary
zoning brings about segregation on an economic basis rather than
on a racial or ethnic basis. 10 2 In any case, judicial action, whether
by the federal courts on an equal protection theory or by the state
courts on the basis of a redefinition of general welfare, cannot deal
effectively with the massive effects of suburban zoning which
largely excludes the only types of housing within the financial
reach of poor people. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized inAppeal of Concord Township (Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.),
l'3
"the overall solution to these problems lies with greater regional
planning"-and, it should be added, regional planning with a
stronger basis in state law and with stronger tools for the imple-
mentation of plans than now exist in most states.
The need for land-use control machinery at the regional or state
level has frequently been mentioned by the courts. The Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act conferred zoning power only on "cities
and incorporated villages," with the comment that this "includes
those municipalities which ordinarily will find it advantageous to
be given zoning powers."' 104 The enormous growth of urban popu-
lation since World War II makes it clear, however, that the
municipality is no longer an appropriate territorial unit for making
certain major land-use decisions. In 1960 some 125 million Amer-
icans- some 73 percent of the total population-lived in "urban"
areas, and 113 million of them-some 63 percent of the total
population- lived in 121 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
which contained 225 central cities, 3 10 counties, and the stagger-
ing total of 4,142 municipalities. 0 5 Of these 4,142 separate mu-
nicipalities, 2,548 were located in the central part of their respec-
tive Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and 1,594 were lo-
cated in the outlying portions thereof.10 6 Since 1960 the concen-
tration of population in metropolitan areas has, of course, in-
creased. It is obvious that with the existing fragmentation of local
governmental power in metropolitan areas, land-use planning and
102See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
103 439 Pa. 466, 476, 268 A.2d 765, 769 (1970).
104 SSZEA, supra note 5, § I & n.5.
105 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1963, at 13 (84th ed.); I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 1962,
at 11-13.
1o6 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1963, at 13 (84th ed.); 1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: 1962,
at 11-13.
[VOL. 6:290
Zoning and Subdivision Control
zoning on a purely municipal basis cannot achieve anything more
than a haphazard and uncoordinated pattern of land use within the
metropolitan areas.
In theory, the county offers a greater opportunity for unified
and rational planning and zoning of urban areas. Some
thirty-seven states currently have county zoning enabling acts; 107
most states have county planning enabling legislation; and at least
nineteen states have county subdivision control enabling acts.10
The county, however, is generally unable to perform urban
land-use control functions effectively in metropolitan areas be-
cause: (1) it cannot zone areas within municipal boundaries; (2)
many metropolitan areas contain two or more counties or parts of
counties; and (3) the administrations of most counties are not
adequately organized to perform urban planning and zoning func-
tions.10o
Extraterritorial zoning by municipal governing bodies has been
relatively little used and is impossible where, as in many metro-
politan areas, most of the land within the areas is already within
the corporate limits of one municipality or another. Moreover,
extraterritorial zoning raises the fundamental question whether
constitutional theory permits a municipality's imposition of legis-
lative land-use policies outside its municipal limits upon citizens
who have no voice in determining such policies.110
An apparently obvious solution of the problem is the estab-
lishment of metropolitan regional governments with com-
prehensive land-use planning and zoning powers. At the present
time, however, only three such governments exist in the United
States, 11 and the prospects for establishment of others are not
encouraging 12 Nevertheless much could be done to rationalize
and improve land-use controls in metropolitan areas if enabling
legislation were revised to make the creation of metropolitan
regional planning agencies mandatory, if such agencies were ade-
quately staffed and funded, and if all municipal zoning regulations
were required by law to conform to a comprehensive regional
land-use plan. In some states, statewide land-use plans might be
necessary, with all municipal and county zoning regulations re-
quired to be in accordance therewith.
10 7Cunningham, supra note 12, at 369 n.3.
10 8 1d. at 419 n.247.1 09 Id. at 406 n.195.
110 Id. at 406 nn. 196, 197.
111 Miami-Dade County, Florida; Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee; and In-
dianapolis-Marion County, Indiana.
"1 Cunningham, supra note 12, at 407 n. 199.
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In response to pressure for movement of land-use planning and
zoning powers to a higher level of government, several states
recently either have established comprehensive statewide
land-use controls or have given state agencies power to control
certain critical types of land use. Hawaii undertook the first and
most far-reaching change in the traditional pattern of local
land-use control. In 1961 statewide zoning power was given to
Hawaii's State Land Use Commission. 113 Under the 1961 legisla-
tion the Commission has divided the entire state into four zones:
urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation. County agencies have
substantial authority to delineate permissible uses within the
boundaries of some zones, subject to the general regulatory power
of the Commission. Enforcement of the zoning regulations in all
zones is the responsibility of the counties, since the Commission
has no enforcement powers.
Responding to pressures from a second-home boom and several
major industrial developments in recent years, Vermont has
created a state board which, with the help of nine District Com-
missions, will ultimately administer a statewide land-use plan.
114
Residential, commercial, and industrial developments on sites of
more than ten acres must obtain state permits under the Vermont
legislation; if a municipality having jurisdiction of the site has not
adopted permanent zoning and subdivision control regulations, a
permit must be obtained from the state for any development on a
site of one acre or more.
A proposed revision of the New Jersey land-use control en-
abling legislation, introduced in 1969 but never enacted," 5 con-
tains significant provisions for state-level planning and devel-
opment controls and would provide for creation of regional plan-
ning boards and zoning boards of adjustment. Similar proposals
are embodied in the New York State Planning Law Revision
Study (1969),r 6 some or all of which has been put into bill form
and introduced for study purposes in recent legislative sessions."
7
And in response to the 1972 Report of the Governor of Mich-
igan's Special Commission on Land Use,"l8 there now exists in
113 HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 205 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
1 14 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, H 6001-6091 (Supp..197 1).
115N.J. Sen. No. 803 (1969).
116 NEW YORK OFFICE OF PLANNING COORDINATION, NEW YORK STATE PLANNING
LAW REVISION STUDY (1970). The study is the basis of a number of the court's observa-
tions in Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 37 1-72 n.6, 375 & n.8, 285 N.E.2d 297
n.6, 299-300 & n.8, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 146 n.6, 149 & n.8 (1972).
"7The proposed bill is noted in Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 285
N.E.2d at 302-03, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
1 18 GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE, REPORT (1972).
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preliminary draft form an Omnibus Land Use and Development
Act which would create in Michigan a state land-use commission,
a state land-use plan, regional land-use commissions, and county
land development plans. The state land-use commission would
control any "development of state impact," including "devel-
opment for housing for persons of low and moderate income by
any person receiving state or federal aid for such devel-
opment."l"9
Another approach to the problems of exclusionary zoning and
providing housing for the poor in suburban areas is New York's
recent creation of its Urban Development Corporation
(NYUDC).120 NYUDC has the power to plan, fund, and execute
housing projects and, if necessary in order to accomplish its
purposes, to override local zoning ordinances, building codes, and
other local land-use controls. 121 NYUDC also has the power of
eminent domain l22 and the power to relocate persons displaced by
its housing developments.12 3 It is exempt from local property
taxes on the increased valuation of land after acquisition but is
liable for assessments to fund local improvements. 124 Additionally
NYUDC is empowered to sue and be sued, to create subsidiaries,
to lend or give funds to subsidiaries, to enter into contracts, and to
issue general revenue bonds.'
Although NYUDC has the power to override local zoning
regulations and to condemn land for its projects, in the first three
years of operation it has attempted to play down the "bully with a
big stick" image by cooperating with local governments and cit-
izen groups in order to develop local commitment to each proj-
ect.126 NYUDC President Edward Logue has recommended that
generally no more than 5 percent of a suburban community's
housing be housing for persons with low incomes, in order to
reduce the burden on municipal facilities and revenues. 2 7 Never-
theless, not everyone has been satisfied with this cautious ap-
proach. Demonstrations have been held at the NYUDC offices
by urban activists charging that NYUDC is impeding, rather than
119The revised preliminary draft of the bill, dated Nov. 9, 1972, is unpublished. A copy
of the bill is on file with the author.
120 New York Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §6251 et
seq. (McKinney Supp. 1972).
121 Id. § 6266(3).
122 Id. § 6255(7).
123id. § 6260(e).124 1d. § 6272.
12Id. §§ 6255, 6262, 6268.
126Reilly & Schulman, The State Urban Development Corporation: New York's In-
novation, I URBAN LAW. 129, 139-40 (1969).
127 Logue, Are Cities a Bust?, LOOK MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 1969, at 70.
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promoting, the growth of low- and middle-income housing by its
cautious policies. 128 Very recently, however, suburban opposition
to proposed low- and middle-income housing projects in West-
chester County has become quite intense, and Governor Rock-
efeller imposed a temporary moratorium on these projects.
129
The 1972 Report of the Governor of Michigan's Special Com-
mission on Land Use recommended, inter alia, that the State
Housing Development Authority should be expanded to function
as a "community development corporation... designed to facil-
itate large-scale community development projects, including hous-
ing, schools, and commercial and industrial facilities ...."130 It
would appear that the New York Urban Development Corpo-
ration is the model for the proposed expansion of the powers of
the existing Michigan Housing Development Authority.
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Even if a state could eliminate all exclusionary zoning practices
by means of state or regional land-use control agencies or devel-
opment agencies, the problem of providing truly low-cost housing
would still remain unsolved. Much of the current excessive cost
of housing construction is a result of the inability of the construc-
tion industry to develop effective mass production techniques, the
retention in most communities of local building codes which pre-
vent the use of less costly materials and improved construction
techniques, and the restrictive practices of the construction trade
unions. These factors certainly contribute very substantially to
the "structure costs" which, in the case of selected single-family
developments in 1966-67 averaged 41.8 percent of the total sell-
ing price of houses in California, 58.6 percent in the Midwest, 51
percent in the Northeast, and 61.7 percent in the South. 13' A
study of eighty-seven selected HUD-assisted multi-family proj-
ects during the period from 1962 to 1966 revealed that structure
costs ranged from a high of 80.2 percent to a low of 49.5 percent
of the total project expenses, with a median of 68.4 percent.
3 2
The primitive "handicraft" technology of the American home-
128Shipler, U.S. Aide Attacks Suburban Zoning, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1970, at 58, col.
1.
129 Greenhouse, State Low-Income Housing Plan is at a Standstill in Westchester, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 6, 1972, at 24, col. I.
' 30 GOVERNOR'S SPECIAL COMMISSION ON LAND USE, REPORT 6 (Recommendation 1I)
(1972).
131 BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 50, at 418 (Table I).
132 Id. at 421 (Table 7).
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building industry is partly a result of the nature of the industry
itself.'3 3 The building industry is a loose conglomeration of small
participants who come together on a project-by-project basis. The
initiator of the construction process brings together architects,
engineers, and a general contractor for a given building devel-
opment. In the past almost all private residential building was
initiated by a merchant-builder, who built a small number of units
for sale, or by an individual lot owner, who contracted for the
construction of a single house for his own use. Although this
pattern continues to predominate, the construction function in
recent years has often been separated from the development func-
tion. The developer buys land, plans its development, and subdi-
vides it where necessary; he then calls in builders to perform the
construction function. The typical building contractor still builds
only a few houses each year and farms out a large part of the
work to specialized subcontractors. Generally speaking, the con-
tractor's organization is assembled for one project only. More-
over, the building industry is composed of thousands of small
firms, a majority of which consists of sole proprietorships with
few full-time employees. The volatility of the industry is reflected
by its extraordinarily high rate of business failures.
The nature of the American homebuilding industry, as outlined
above, precludes the expenditure of substantial sums of money for
research on improved construction technology. In any case, obso-
lete and widely varying building codes in most localities preclude
easy and rapid shifts to new methods of construction utilizing
specialized structural and mechanical components assembled at
offsite locations, as well as offsite construction of most elements
of the frame or shell of buildings, or offsite construction of entire
houses in large sections. Reductions in costs through offsite con-
struction techniques are possible for several reasons: (1) labor
costs per unit of output are usually reduced; (2) since a much
larger proportion of the work is done under cover, less time is lost
and less cost incurred because of bad weather; and (3) the pre-
fabrication process itself can save a great deal of time. 13 4
One of the major reasons for high costs in the traditional onsite
construction process is the high cost of labor. The labor force
consists of skilled craftsmen, usually members of construction
trade unions. The onsite nature of the construction process makes
employment subject to substantial seasonal variation and to in-
13 3The discussion in this and the following paragraphs is largely based on id. at 431-43.
134 For a detailed treatment of prospects for reducing housing costs with existing
technology, see id.at 432-43.
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terruptions at almost any time because of weather conditions.
And the nature of the construction industry itself-highly frag-
mented and organized on a project-by-project basis-makes for
much uncertainty as to the amount and duration of employment.
As a result, hourly wage rates are very high compared to pre-
vailing rates in many of the more "industrialized" industries.
Moreover, the construction trade unions have generally been vig-
orously opposed to adoption of offsite construction techniques
and have often prevented cost savings through the use of such
techniques by refusing to handle prefabricated units or by in-
sisting that they be torn apart and reassembled onsite by union
members. 135
The factors discussed in the preceding three paragraphs clearly
constitute much more significant obstacles to production of true
low-cost housing than the housing costs resulting from local subdi-
vision regulations. Any serious attempt to deal with the problem
of housing the poor must, therefore, include efforts to eliminate
these factors, as well as efforts to eliminate the exclusionary
zoning practices discussed in detail in an earlier portion of this
article.
135See Woodwork Manufacturers v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
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